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ABSTRACT
State-of-the-art extractive multi-document summarization
systems are usually designed without any concern about pri-
vacy issues, meaning that all documents are open to third
parties. In this paper we propose a privacy-preserving ap-
proach to multi-document summarization. Our approach
enables other parties to obtain summaries without learning
anything else about the original documents’ content.
We use a hashing scheme known as Secure Binary Embed-
dings to convert documents representation containing key
phrases and bag-of-words into bit strings, allowing the com-
putation of approximate distances, instead of exact ones.
Our experiments indicate that our system yields similar re-
sults to its non-private counterpart on standard multi-docu-
ment evaluation datasets.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]; I.2.7 [Natural
Language Processing]: Text analysis; K.4.1 [Computers
and Society]: Public Policy Issues—privacy
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation
Keywords
Secure Summarization, Multi-document Summarization, Wa-
terfall KP-Centrality, Secure Binary Embeddings, Data Pri-
vacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Extractive Multi-document Summarization (EMS) is the
problem of extracting the most important sentences in a
set of documents. State-of-the-art solutions for EMS based
on Waterfall KP-Centrality achieve excellent results [11]. A
limitation to the usage of such methods is their assump-
tion that the input texts are of public domain. However,
Copyright is held by the author/owner(s).
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problems arise when these documents cannot be made pub-
lic. Consider the scenario where a company has millions of
classified documents organized into several topics. The com-
pany may need to obtain a summary from each topic, but it
lacks the computational power or know-how to do so. At the
same time, they can not share those documents with a third
party with such capabilities, as they may contain sensitive
information. As a result, the company must obfuscate their
own data before sending it to the third party, a requirement
that is seemingly at odds with the objective of extracting
summaries from it.
In this paper, we propose a new privacy-preserving tech-
nique for EMS based on Secure Binary Embeddings (SBE)
[2] that enables exactly this – it provides a mechanism for
obfuscating, not only named-entities [17], but the complete
data, while still achieving near state-of-art performance in
EMS. SBE is a kind of locality-sensitive hashing algorithm
which converts data arrays such as bag-of-words vectors to
obfuscated bit strings through a combination of random pro-
jections followed by banded quantization. The method has
information theoretic guarantees of security, ensuring that
the original data cannot be recovered from the bit strings.
They also provide a mechanism for computing distances
between vectors that are close to one another without reveal-
ing the global geometry of the data, such as the number of
features, consequently enabling tasks such as EMS. This is
achievable because, unlike other hashing methods which re-
quire exact matches for performing retrieval or classification
tasks, SBE allows for a near-exact matching: the hashes can
be used to estimate the distances between vectors that are
very close, but provably provide no information whatsoever
about the distance between vectors that are farther apart.
The usefulness of SBE has already been shown in privacy-
preserving important passage retrieval [10] and speaker ver-
ification [14] systems, yielding promising results.
2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Multi-document Summarization
Most of the current work in automatic summarization fo-
cuses on extractive summarization. Popular baselines for
multi-document summarization fall into one of the follow-
ing general models: Centrality-based [15, 4, 16], Maximal
Marginal Relevance (MMR) [3, 5, 7], and Coverage-based
methods [9]. Additionally, methods such as KP-Centrality
[16], which is centrality and coverage-based, follow more
than one paradigm. In general, Centrality-based models are
used to produce generic summaries, while the MMR fam-
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ily generates query-oriented ones. Coverage-based models
produce summaries driven by words, topics or events.
We use the Waterfall KP-Centrality method because it is
a state-of-the-art EMS method, but the ideas in this work
could be applied to any other EMS methods.
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Methods
In this work, we focus on creating a method for perform-
ing EMS while keeping the original documents private. To
the best of our knowledge, the combination of research lines
has only been explored for the single-document summariza-
tion case [10]. However, there are some additional recent
works combining information retrieval and privacy. Most of
these works use data encryption [6, 12] to transfer the data
in a secure way. The problem with these methods is that the
entity responsible for producing the summaries will have ac-
cess to the documents content, while our method guarantees
that no party aside from the owner of the documents will
have access to their content. Another secure information
retrieval methodology is to obfuscate queries, which hides
user topical intention but does not secure the content of the
documents [13].
In many areas, the interest in privacy-preserving meth-
ods where two or more parties are involved and they wish
to jointly perform a given operation without disclosing their
private information is not new, and several techniques such
as Garbled Circuits (GC), Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
and Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) have been introduced.
However, they all have limitations regarding the EMS task
we wish to address. Until recently, GC methods were ex-
tremely inefficient and difficult to adapt, specially when the
computation of non-linear operations, such as the cosine dis-
tance, is required. Systems based on HE techniques usually
require extremely long amounts of time to evaluate any func-
tion of interest. The LSH technique allows for near-exact
match detection between data points, but does not provide
any actual notion of distance, leading to degradation of per-
formance in some applications. As a result, we decided to
consider SBE as the data privacy for our approach, as it does
not show any of the disadvantages mentioned above for the
task at hand.
3. MULTI-DOCUMENT SUMMARIZATION
To determine the most representative sentences of a set
of documents, we used a multi-document approach based on
KP-Centrality [16]. This method is adaptable and robust
in the presence of noisy input. This is an important aspect
since using several documents as input frequently increases
the amount of unimportant content.
Waterfall KP-Centrality iteratively combines the summa-
ries of each document that was generated using KP-Centrali-
ty following a cascade process: it starts by merging the inter-
mediate summaries of the first two documents, according to
their chronological order. This merged intermediate sum-
mary is then summarized and merged with the summary
of following document. We iterate this process through all
documents until the most recent one. The summarization
method uses as input a set of key phrases that we extract
from each input document, joins the extracted sets, and
ranks the key phrases using their frequency. To generate
each intermediate summary, we use the top key phrases, ex-
cluding the ones that do not occur in the input document.
KP-Centrality extracts a set of key phrases using a su-
pervised approach and combines them with a bag-of-words
model in a compact matrix representation, given by:w(t1, p1) . . . w(t1, pN ) w(t1, k1) . . . w(t1, kM )... ...
w(tT , p1) . . . w(tT , pN ) w(tT , k1) . . . w(tT , kM )
 ,
(1)
where w is a function of the number of occurrences of each
term t in every passage p or key phrase k, T is the number of
terms, N is the number of sentences and M is the number of
key phrases. Then, using I ∪K , p1, . . . , pN , k1, . . . , kM =
q1, . . . , qN+M , a support set Si is computed for each passage
pi using:
Si , {s ∈ I ∪K : sim(s, qi) > εi ∧ s 6= qi}, (2)
for i = 1, . . . , N +M . Passages are ranked excluding the set
of key phrases (artificial passages) according to:
arg max
s∈(∪Ni=1Si)−K
∣∣{Si : s ∈ Si}∣∣. (3)
A support set is a group of the most semantically related
passages. These semantic passages are selected using heuris-
tics based on the passage order method [16]. The metric that
is normally used is the cosine distance.
4. SECURE BINARY EMBEDDINGS
An SBE is a scheme for converting vectors to bit sequences
using quantized random projections. It produces a LSH
method with an interesting property: if the Euclidean dis-
tance between two vectors is lower than a certain threshold,
then the Hamming distance between their hashes is propor-
tional to the Euclidean distance; otherwise, no information
can be infered. This scheme is based on the concept of Uni-
versal Quantization (UQ)[1], which redefines scalar quan-
tization by forcing the quantization function to have non-
contiguous quantization regions. That is, the quantization
process converts an L-dimensional vector x ∈ RL into an
M -bit binary sequence, where the m-th bit is defined by:
qm(x) = Q
( 〈x,am〉+ wm
∆m
)
(4)
Here 〈, 〉 represents a dot product. am ∈ RL is a “mea-
surement” vector comprising L i.i.d. samples drawn from
N (µ = 0, σ2), ∆m is a precision parameter and wm is ran-
dom number drawn from a uniform distribution over [0,∆m].
Q(·) is a quantization function given by Q(x) = bx%2c. We
can represent the complete quantization into M bits com-
pactly in vector form:
q(x) = Q
(
∆−1(Ax + w)
)
(5)
Here q(x) is an M -bit binary vector, which we will refer to
as the hash of x, A ∈ RM×L is a matrix of random elements
drawn from N (µ = 0, σ2), ∆ is a diagonal matrix with en-
tries ∆m and w ∈ RM is a vector of random elements drawn
from a uniform distribution over [0,∆m]. The universal 1-
bit quantizer of Equation 4 maps the real line onto 1/0 in a
banded manner, where each band is ∆m wide. Figure 1 com-
pares conventional scalar 1-bit quantization (left panel) with
the equivalent universal 1-bit quantization (right panel).
The binary hash vector generated by the Universal Quan-
tizer of Equation 5 has an interesting property: the ham-
ming distance Hamm(q(x),q)(y)) between the hashes of
Figure 1: 1-bit quantization functions.
two vectors x and y is correlated to the Euclidean distance
‖x − y‖ between the two vectors, if the Euclidean distance
between the two vectors is less than a threshold (which de-
pends on ∆m). However, if the distance between x and y
is greater than this threshold, Hamm(q(x),q)(y)) yields no
information about the true distance between the vectors [2].
In order to illustrate how this scheme works, we randomly
generated samples in a high-dimensional space (L = 1024)
and plotted the normalized Hamming distance between their
hashes against the Euclidean distance between the respec-
tive samples. This is presented in Figure 2. The number of
bits in the hash is also shown in the figures.
Figure 2: Embedding behaviour for different values
of ∆ and different amounts of measurements M .
We note that in all cases, once the normalized distance
exceeds ∆, the hamming distance between the hashes of two
vectors ceases to provide any information about the true
distance between the vectors. We will find this properly
useful in developing our privacy-preserving MDS system.
We also see that changing the value of the precision pa-
rameter ∆ allows us to adjust the distance threshold until
which the hamming distance is informative. Also, increasing
the number of bits M leads to a reduction of the variance
of the Hamming distance. Yet another interesting property
conjectured for the SBE is that recovering x from q(x) is
NP -hard, even given A.
5. SECURE MULTI-DOCUMENT
SUMMARIZATION
Our methodology consists in iteratively running the secure
single-document summarization method [10], which com-
prises four stages. In the first stage we obtain a represen-
tation of each document, which is the first step of the KP-
Centrality method. In the second stage we compute SBE
hashes using the document representation. The third stage
ranks the passages, which corresponds to the second step
of the KP-Centrality method. Because we are now work-
ing with SBE hashes instead of the original document rep-
resentation, this is performed using the Hamming distance
instead of the cosine distance. Finally, the last stage is to
use the ranks of sentences to obtain the summary.
Our approach for a privacy-preserving multi-document
summarization system closely follows the formulation pre-
sented in Section 3. However, there is a very important
difference in terms of who performs each of the steps of the
single-document summarization method. Typically, the only
party involved, Alice, who owns the original documents, per-
forms key phrase extraction, combines them with the bag-of-
words model in a compact matrix representation, computes
the support sets for each document and finally uses them to
retrieve the summaries. In our scenario, Alice does not know
how to extract the important passages from the document
collection and/or does not possess the computational power
to do so. Therefore, she must outsource the summarization
process to a another entity, Bob, who has these capabili-
ties. However, Alice must first obfuscate the information
contained in the compact matrix representation. If Bob re-
ceives this information as is, he could use the term frequen-
cies to infer on the contents of the original documents and
gain access to private or classified information Alice does not
wish to disclose. Alice computes binary hashes of her com-
pact matrix representation using the method described in
Section 4, keeping the randomization parameters A and w
to herself. She sends these hashes to Bob, who computes the
support sets and extracts the important passages. Because
Bob receives binary hashes instead of the original matrix
representation, he must use the normalized Hamming dis-
tance instead of the cosine distance in this step, since it is
the metric the SBE hashes best relate to. Finally, he returns
the hashes corresponding to the important passages to Al-
ice, who then uses them to get the information she desires.
These steps are repeated as many times as needed until the
multi-document summarization process is complete.
6. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we illustrate the performance of our privacy-
preserving approach to EMS and how it compares to its non-
private counterpart. We start by presenting the datasets we
used in our experiments, then we describe the experimental
setup and finally we present some results.
To assess the quality of the summaries generated by our
methods, we used ROUGE–1 [8] on DUC 2007 and TAC
2009 datasets. DUC 20071 dataset includes 45 clusters of
25 newswire documents and 4 human-created 250-word ref-
erence summaries. TAC 20092 has 44 topic clusters. Each
topic has 2 sets of 10 news documents. There are 4 human-
created 100-word reference summaries for each set. The ref-
erence summaries for the first set are query-oriented and
for the second set are update summaries. In this work, we
used the first set of reference summaries. We evaluated the
different models by generating summaries with 250 words.
We present some baseline experiments in order to obtain
reference values for our approach. We generated 250 words
summaries for both TAC 2009 and DUC 2007 datasets. For
both experiments, we used the cosine and the Euclidean dis-
tance as evaluation metrics, since the first is the usual metric
for computing textual similarity, but the second is the one
that relates to the Secured Binary Embeddings technique.
All results are presented in terms of ROUGE [8], in partic-
ular ROUGE–1, which is the most widely used evaluation
measure for this scenario. The results we obtained for the
TAC 2009 and the DUC 2007 are presented in Table 1.
We considered 40 key phrases in our experiments since it
1http://www-nlpir.nist.gov/projects/duc/duc2007/tasks.html
2http://www.nist.gov/tac/2009/Summarization/
Metric TAC 2009 DUC 2007
Cosine distance 0.514 0.370
Euclidean distance 0.489 0.364
Table 1: Reference Waterfall KP-Centrality results
with 40 key phrases, in terms of ROUGE–1.
leakage ∼ 5% ∼ 25% ∼ 50% ∼ 75% ∼ 95%
bpc=4 0.331 0.343 0.338 0.347 0.347
bpc=8 0.339 0.341 0.341 0.352 0.356
bpc=16 0.336 0.348 0.337 0.350 0.351
Table 2: Waterfall KP-Centrality using SBE and the
DUC 2007 corpus, in terms of ROUGE–1.
leakage ∼ 5% ∼ 25% ∼ 50% ∼ 75% ∼ 95%
bpc=4 0.475 0.472 0.458 0.478 0.487
bpc=8 0.462 0.472 0.469 0.473 0.486
bpc=16 0.448 0.467 0.462 0.484 0.491
Table 3: Waterfall KP-Centrality using SBE and the
TAC 2009 corpus, in terms of ROUGE–1.
is the usual choice when news articles are considered [16].
As expected, we notice some slight degradation when the
Euclidean distance is considered, but we still achieve better
results than other state-of-the-art methods such as MEAD
[15], MMR [3], Expect n-call@k [7], and LexRank [4].
Reported results in the literature include ROUGE–1 =
0.328 and 0.415 using MEAD, ROUGE–1 = 0.327 and 0.392
using MMR, ROUGE–1 = 0.321 and 0.387 using Expect n-
call@k for the DUC 2007 and TAC 2009 datasets, respec-
tively [11]. This means that the forced change of metric due
to the intrinsic properties of SBE and the multiple applica-
tion of SBE does not affect the validity of our approach in
any way.
For our privacy-preserving approach we performed exper-
iments using different values for the SBE parameters. The
results we obtained in terms of ROUGE for the DUC 2007
and the TAC 2009 datasets are presented in Tables 2 and
3, respectively. Leakage denotes the percentage of SBE
hashes that the normalized Hamming distance dH is pro-
portional to the Euclidean distance dE between the original
data vectors. The amount of leakage is controlled by ∆.
Bits per coefficient (bpc) is the ratio between the number
of measurements M and the dimensionality of the original
data vectors L, i.e., bpc = M/L. Unsurprisingly, increasing
the amount of leakage (i.e., increasing ∆) leads to improving
the summarization results. However, changing bpc does not
lead to improved performance. The reason for this might
be due to the Waterfall KP-Centrality method using sup-
port sets that consider multiple partial representations of
all documents. Even so, the most significant results is that
for 95% leakage there is an almost negligible loss of perfor-
mance. This scenario, however, does not violate our privacy
requisites in any way, since although most of the distances
between hashes are known, it is not possible to use this infor-
mation to obtain anything about the original information.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we introduced a privacy-preserving technique
for performing Extractive Multi-document Summarization
that has similar performance to their non-private counter-
part. Our Secure Binary Embeddings based approach pro-
vides secure multiple documents representations that allows
for sensitive information to be processed by third parties
without any risk of sensitive information disclosure. We also
found it rather interesting to observe such a small degrada-
tion on the results given that we needed to compute SBE
hashes on each iteration of our algorithm.
Future work will explore the possibility of having multiple
rather than a single entity supplying all the documents.
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